The need for Europeans to urgently strengthen their defence is today clearer than ever. Russia’s illegal invasion against Ukraine has upended the post- Cold War security architecture. Simultaneously, developments in the Middle East, involving both state and non-state actors, create destabilizing effects. At the same time, new forms of hybrid threats, such as disinformation and cyber- attacks, are threatening the resilience of our societies and call for a holistic approach to preparedness. Additionally, the new U.S. administration has shown its inclination to redefine and redraw its engagement in European security, by possibly allocating fewer resources to defending its European allies, while urging them to contribute more to the burden-sharing within NATO.
It is true that considerable progress has been achieved over the past few years and the European People’s Party has taken, at all levels, a leading role towards a true European Defence Union. Many useful initiatives have been undertaken or are underway to strengthen European defence, especially since 2022 or earlier. National defence spending has risen across the continent, initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) have already shown their potential, while others, such the European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Program (EDIP), can lay the framework for further progress.
However, we are still falling short, and time is not on our side. To respond to the emerging challenges and create the foundation for our strategic autonomy, we must decisively tackle our gaps and inefficiencies.
Funding European defence has proven to be the most complex issue in this endeavour. Various options have been explored, from activating the escape clauseof the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) or repurposing the use of cohesion funds and/or Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds to joint borrowing via the EU or via a special purpose vehicle. We should remain open to those options, without sacrificing speed for perfection. However, we need to pursue some game changers to send a clear message to both friends and foes about our commitment to take EU defence seriously. Collective initiatives such as the development of a European air defence shield can address major vulnerabilities in our security, offer incentives to European defence companies to innovate and strengthen our overall defence posture.
Europeans have recently made progress in strengthening their defence, but much remains to be done. The EU can play an important role in that endeavour, in complementarity with national efforts and, of course, NATO. Besides, the EU and the US should act within the context of NATO. The future of the EU’s defence efforts will be shaped by how we approach the questions of funding, by how the EU structures its defence tools, and by its stance towards partnerships. An open, pragmatic approach, sharply focused on Europe’s military needs would serve Europeans well in an era of ever-increasing volatility.
The European People’s Party:
Calls the European Union to address three major issues in order to strengthen its defence capability. First, we must swiftly fill the gap in defence spending and agree on ambitious targets. Second, we must address the fragmentation of national planning and procurement efforts. Third, we need to be smarter in terms of how we allocate our resources, through better interoperability, common standards and full support to the European defence industry, which is unfortunately still fragmented.
Reiterates the importance of Member States allocating enough funds to defence spending, in order to uphold peace and security in Europe. To begin with, they must fulfil the 2% defense investment commitments assumed with NATO through their own national budgets.
Urges the European Commission to promptly propose a plan of utilizing flexibilities within the Stability and Growth Pact, in order to enable substantial national defence spending. At the same time, the European Commission should safeguard equal treatment to Member States that have already been consistently meeting the NATO defence expenditure target of 2%.